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I. Introduction
The rapid growth of the Internet has permanently changed the
way consumers purchase goods and services. The rise of electronic
commerce ("e-commerce") is widely viewed as a positive aspect of
the Internet revolution. As Internet retailing continues to grow, more
choices will be available to consumers, which, in turn, will drive
down prices of consumer goods. Despite these benefits, some
industries are resisting attempts to open their markets to online
competition in the name of consumer protection. State regulations,
which pre-date the Internet, are being used to thwart sales of some
products online.' In some instances, legislation has been enacted to
limit online retailers in a given industry. For example, the automobile
industry successfully lobbied all fifty state legislatures to ban the
unfettered sale of automobiles online.2 The justifications for these
restrictive measures vary between industries, but they are frequently
* J.D., May 2003, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A., History,
University of Massachusetts Boston.
' See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.3a(1)(c) (2003) (prohibiting the online
sale of funeral merchandise).
2 State Impediments to E-Commerce: Consumer Protection or Veiled
Protectionism? Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Protection of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 37-38
(2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Ted Cruz, Director, Office of Policy
Planning, Federal Trade Commission) (explaining that a seller must maintain a
franchise presence in a state in order to sell new automobiles to residents of that
state over the Internet), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
107/action/107-130.pdf.
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supported by the goal of consumer protection or consumer safety.3
Many consumer advocates challenge these justifications, however,
claiming that the restrictions are, for the most part, designed to
protect entrenched brick-and-mortar industries.
4
Recently, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") held hearings and a workshop on the issue of government
impediments to e-commerce.5 Although Congress did not introduce
legislation to combat these impediments, a number of legislators
expressed concern that state regulations would continue to hinder the
potential growth of e-commerce. 6 These hearings provide an
excellent overview of how various industries confront legislative
roadblocks when attempting to market products online.
In particular, one industry has not waited for Congress to act.
Wineries and consumers recently brought actions challenging state
statutes that prohibit the online purchase of liquor from out-of-state
sources.7 These lawsuits allege that the liquor statutes violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 8 In response, state liquor control boards
argue that they have an express constitutional right to regulate liquor
sold within their borders under the Twenty-first Amendment.
9
This article will first discuss the policy concerns that give rise
to state regulations in various online industries, which in many
instances are strikingly similar. The article will then take a closer
look at the first and most significant case law to date dealing with the
state regulations of the online alcohol industry.
3 See Hearing, supra note 2, at 36.
4 See id. at 9 (statement of Rob Atkinson, Vice President, Progressive Policy
Institute).
5 See id.at 6 (statement of Sen. Tauzin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade and Consumer Protection).
6 See id. at 3, 6 (statements of Sen. Tauzin and Rep. Steams).
7 See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000)
(upholding constitutionality of Indiana's alcoholic beverage statute); Bolick v.
Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding Virginia's Alcohol
Beverage Control Act unconstitutional); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding unconstitutional Texas's statutory ban on direct
importation of wine by Texas residents).
8 See Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 426; Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 676-77.
9 See Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
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II. Background
Several industries presently face substantial barriers to e-
commerce.10 Online industries face significant obstacles because the
state regulations involved predate the Internet.'' The House of
Representatives' Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection discussed these and related issues on September 26, 2002,
during a hearing that was co-chaired by Senator Billy Tauzin of
Louisiana and Representative Cliff Stearns of Florida. 12
According to Ted Cruz, Director of the Office of Policy
Planning at the FTC, there are two significant types of possible
barriers to e-commerce.13 The first type involves the use of
anticompetitive tactics-when suppliers or dealers band together to
limit online sales, for example.' 4 The second type of barrier involves
state and local regulations that impose occupational licensing and
physical office requirements.15 Although these regulations may be
pro-consumer in orientation, they may effectively restrict Internet
competitors from entering a given state's market.' 6 The following
industries provide examples where such possibility exists.
A. Replacement Contact Lenses
A number of states have restrictions prohibiting online sales
of replacement contact lenses.17 The firms that sell these products do
not actually contour the contact lens for the eye.' 8 Rather, they
replace pre-existing lenses for customers who have already had their
lenses fitted by professionals. 19 Georgia and New Mexico are two
states that require a state-licensed professional to sell all types of
1o Hearing, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Rep. Steams).
1 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 35 (statement of Ted Cruz, Director, Office of Policy Planning,
Federal Trade Commission).
14 id.
"5 Hearing, supra note 2, at 35.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 36.
18 id.
19 Id.
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20contact lenses. Other states, like Connecticut, are considering
similar regulations.2'
State boards of optometry contend that the online sales of
contact lenses pose a risk to consumer health, and that state licensing
requirements and an in-state presence is necessary to ensure the
overall quality of the product.22 In addition, proponents of the
regulations fear that the availability of contact lenses over the Internet
will reduce the number of times a consumer visits an optometrist,
thereby increasing health and safety risks.2 3
Recently, the FTC opposed regulations that proposed to
restrict the online sale of replacement contact lenses. 24 According to
the FTC, requiring stand-alone sellers to obtain optician and optical
establishment licenses "would likely increase consumer costs while
producing no offsetting health benefits.', 25 Rather than improve
consumer optical health, increased licensing costs could lead to
higher prices, which could lead consumers to replace their contact
26lenses less frequently. The FTC also stated that the current
regulatory regime both at federal and state levels is sufficient to
protect the health of those who wear contact lenses.
27
B. Funeral Casket Sales
Another industry facing restrictions on Internet sales is the
funeral casket business. Specifically, Oklahoma has prohibited the
sale of funeral caskets over the Internet.28 The Oklahoma Funeral
Services Licensing Act ("FSLA") requires that all individuals
engaged in the "sale of any funeral merchandise" be licensed
20 Hearing, supra note 2, at 26 (statement of Joe Zeidner, General Counsel of
1-800 Contacts).
21 Id. at 36 (statement of Ted Cruz, Director, Office of Policy Planning,
Federal Trade Commission).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Federal Trade Commission, FTC provides Connecticut with Comments on
the Sale of Contact Lenses by Out-of-State Sources (Mar. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/03/ contactlenses.htm.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 id.
28 OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 396.3a(1)(c).
362 [Vol. 15: 4
2003] Recent Challenges to State Restrictions on E-Commerce 363
pursuant to the FSLA.29 In addition, the FSLA requires sales of
funeral merchandise to be made in a licensed funeral service
establishment. To become a licensed funeral establishment, one
must have a specific street address, a room for preparing dead bodies,
viewing rooms, and a full-time licensed funeral director on the
premises. 31 These regulations mandate that only state-licensed funeral
directors working from a state-licensed funeral establishment can sell
caskets. Consequently, online sales are prohibited.
One Internet casket retailer challenged the Oklahoma
regulations in federal district court. The FTC filed an amicus brief in
32support of the retailer. In arguing for removal of the regulations, the
FTC stated in its brief that the funeral industry in Oklahoma is merely
insulating itself from competition that could lower prices and provide
other consumer benefits. 33 Further, the FTC argued that the
regulations deny Oklahoma consumers alternative avenues to
purchase caskets from third-party sources, such as the Internet.34 The
FTC noted that third party sources offer less expensive caskets,
which are typically the most expensive component of traditional
funeral services offered by funeral homes.
3 5
In support of the Oklahoma funeral regulations, the Oklahoma
State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors ("Board")
contended that the regulations protect consumers from fraud.3
Furthermore, the Board argued that without restriction on the sale of
caskets to funeral directors, there would be no relief to consumers,
"as there would be no regulatory oversight over them." 37 As the FTC
pointed out, however, even without the Oklahoma regulations an
unscrupulous funeral casket seller would still be subject to consumer
29 Id.
30 id.
31 OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 235:10-3-2 (2000).
32 See Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission,
Powers v. Harris, No. CIV-01-445-F, 2002 WL 32026155 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12,
2002) [hereinafter FTC Amicus Brief], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/
09/okamicus.pdf (Aug. 29, 2002).
" Id. at 17.
34 Id.
35 id.
16 Id. at 14.
37 Id.
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protection statutes and a possible FTC enforcement action.
C. Auctions
One form of e-commerce that has benefited consumers is
online auction sales, managed by companies such as eBay Inc. Online
"auction marketplaces" like eBay provide consumers with the ability
to purchase goods inexpensively, as eBay sellers set low prices to
compete with other eBay sellers, as well as other online and offline
retailers.3 9 This type of price competition means that consumers need
not rely solely on the selection and price offered by retailers in their
local markets. As a result, local retailers must consider the price of
products on eBay when charging consumers. The ability of eBay to
connect sellers with buyers resulted in transactions totaling over $10
billion in 2001.40
Despite these benefits, a number of current and proposed state
auction laws could thwart the progress of eBay and other online
marketplaces. 4 1 Tod Cohen, associate general counsel of eBay, gave a
detailed analysis of these threats in his testimony before the
42Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection.
Cohen identified the possibility that state regulators could apply state
auction laws to eBay.43 This would require eBay and similar
companies to obtain auction licenses.44 Some state requirements for
auctioneer licenses are remarkably burdensome.45 Not surprisingly, if
a large number of states were to apply auction regulations, it would
become cumbersome for online auction houses to continue to conduct
business in distant states.46
38 FTC Amicus Brief, supra note 32, at 14.
39 Hearing, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of Tod Cohen, Associate General
Counsel, Global Policy, eBay, Inc.).
40 id. at 14.
41 Id. at 16.
42 Id. at 16-17.
43 Id. at 16.
44Id.
45 Id. For example, North Carolina requires auctioneer applicants to take an
eighty-hour course on auctioneering, involving topics such as bid-calling, voice
control, and cattle and livestock. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, r. 4B.0301, 4B.0502
(June 2003).
46 Hearing, supra note 2, at 16.
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Cohen noted another problem with applying state auction law
to companies like eBay.47 Should eBay and other online marketplaces
be treated as auction houses, they would be liable for any
misrepresentation of the items being auctioned.48 While appearing
consumer-friendly on its face, exposing eBay to that type of liability
would be unwarranted. Typically, this type of broad liability is
designed for a traditional auction house-one that takes possession of
the goods being sold and is able to review their condition and
authenticate their origin.49 Unlike a traditional auction house,
however, eBay never takes possession of the goods sold on its site,
nor does it make representations about goods that pass through its
website. 50 Exposing eBay to this type of heightened liability would
negatively affect its customers because it would likely have to
markup the goods on its site, thereby diminishing eBay's principal
benefit to consumers.
5 1
Several states have introduced bills that could regulate eBay
and eBay's sellers. 52 The Missouri legislature introduced a bill that
defined auctions so broadly that it could apply to eBay.53 In addition,
the California and New York legislatures proposed revisions to their
current auction laws that could have applied to eBay.54 These bills
were defeated, but they provide examples of state legislatures' efforts
to regulate, and potentially hinder e-commerce.
D. Wine Sales
The wine industry faces the most significant barriers to e-
commerce. One winery trade representative called wineries the
"poster children for state impediments to e-commerce. ' 55 Many
consumers use the Internet to obtain unique wines that are not
available at their local liquor store. Unfortunately, some states have
4' Hearing, supra note 2, at 16.
48 Id.
49 id.
50 Id.
' Id. at 17.
52 Hearing, supra note 2, at 17.
53 Id.
54 id.
55 Id. at 20 (statement of David P. Sloane, President of American Vintners
Association).
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56regulations in place that prohibit such a practice. These regulations
highlight the tension between the need to protect consumer health and
safety and perceived economic protectionism.
In the aftermath of Prohibition, most states adopted a
mandatory three-tier system of distribution for alcoholic beverages. 57
This tiered system, which still exists in many states, requires
producers of alcoholic products to sell only through wholesalers, who
in turn sell to retailers, who then distribute to consumers. 58 The
explosive growth of smaller independent wineries, which has
increased the number of wineries to 2700 in the United States, has
made it difficult for wholesalers to properly service small wineries. 59
Further, many wholesalers are reluctant to represent wineries that
60have small production capabilities. In general, wholesalers would
rather stick with larger national brands that generate more sales
volume. 61 As a result, small wineries have difficulty gaining access to
distant markets.62
To address this problem, wineries lobbied state legislatures to
allow the direct interstate shipment of wine to consumers. 63 In
response, liquor wholesaler lobbying groups pressured state
legislatures to oppose such measures, and in some cases to make it a
64crime. As a result, five states have made the direct shipment of
liquor to individuals a felony. 65 Overall, more than one-half of the
states still require liquor to pass through a mandatory three-tier
system.66
Those in favor of statutes prohibiting the direct shipment of
56 See e.g., TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 107.07(f) (2002).
57 See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000);
Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464, 465 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
58 Hearing, supra note 2, at 20 (statement of David P. Sloane, President of
American Vintners Association).
'9 Id. at 19-20.
60 Id. at 20.
61 Id.
62 id.
63 Hearing, supra note 2, at 20.
64 id.
65 Id. The five states are Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, and
Tennessee. Id.
66 Id.
366 [Vol. 15: 4
2003] Recent Challenges to State Restrictions on E-Commerce 367
alcohol to consumers argue that the statutes are necessary to protect
people from the evils of alcohol.67 Some argue that minors will have
easier access to liquor if orders can be placed over the Internet.68 In
addition, proponents of direct shipment bans contend that state excise
tax revenues will be decreased as a result of allowing people to
purchase wine from out-of-state sources via the Internet.
6F
In contrast, those in favor of dismantling the three-tier system
claim that the state restrictions are a pretext for economic
protectionism.70 This faction, typically made up of small wineries,
argue that in-state wholesalers support the restrictive legislation for
fear of declining revenues as a result of individuals purchasing
alcohol from out-of-state sources.7 1 Moreover, states in which direct
shipment is allowed have reported no decrease in excise tax revenues
from lost wine sales.72
III. Analysis of Recent Challenges to State Prohibitions
on the Direct Shipment of Alcohol
Since wineries encountered difficulties when they attempted
to convince state legislators to allow interstate delivery of alcohol to
consumers, many wineries chose to seek relief in the courts.7 3
Frustrated consumers who are unable to purchase the wine of their
choice online joined the wineries in the lawsuits. The plaintiffs'
primary claim in these cases is that state restrictions on direct
shipment of alcohol violate the Dormant Commerce Clause 74 because
67 Id. at 21.
68 Hearing, supra note 2, at 21.
69 Id.
70 id.
71 Id. See also Ben Lieberman, Prohibition's Last Gasp, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
REv., Jan. 13, 2003, at A8 (discussing some of these arguments).
72 Hearing, supra note 2, at 21.
73 See, e.g., Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2002).
74 The "Dormant Commerce Clause" is the judicially-created doctrine
prohibiting state regulation from unduly burdening interstate commerce, even
where the federal government can but has not acted. See Robert H. Bork & Daniel
E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate
Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 877-79 (2002).
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the statutes favor in-state producers of alcohol.75 Below is an analysis
of the first and most significant decisions that have dealt with this
issue.
A. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson
In Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, the Seventh Circuit was
the first Circuit Court of Appeals in the Internet age to decide
whether a state statutory regime regulating direct alcohol shipments
was unconstitutional.76 The Indiana statute at issue prohibited all
direct shipments by any "person in the business of selling alcoholic
beverages in another state or country," however, it allowed "local
wineries, but not wineries 'in the business of selling ... in another
state or country,' to ship directly to Indiana consumers."77 The
plaintiffs in Bridenbaugh were consumers who argued that the statute
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because it prohibited only
out-of-state sellers of wine from delivering directly to Indiana
consumers. In an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook, however,
the Seventh Circuit held that the statute was constitutional under the
Twenty-first Amendment.79
In finding for the defendants, the Seventh Circuit relied
heavily on Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which provides
that "[t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.",80 This provision gives state legislatures the right to
establish the common three-tiered system that many state use to
regulate the consumption of alcohol. As the court noted, "[1]ike the
Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act before Prohibition, [Section]
2 enables a state to do to importation of liquor-including direct
deliveries to consumers in original packages-what it chooses to do
to internal sales of liquor, but nothing more." 81
75 See e.g., Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir.
2000); Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
76 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d 848.
71 Id. at 849, 851.
78 Id. at 849.
79 Id. at 854.
'0 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
81 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
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This interpretation of Section 2 effectively elevated a state
government power over the Dormant Commerce Clause. In fact, the
court alluded to the fact that Section 2 actually appears in the
Constitution, whereas the Dormant Commerce Clause does not. In
addition, the court found that "[n]o decision of the Supreme Court
holds or implies that laws limited to the importation of liquor are
problematic under the [D]ormant [C]ommerce [C]lause. 83
The Seventh Circuit further pointed out that if consumers
were able to order liquor from out-of-state sources, Indiana state
84
excise taxes would not get paid. One of the original purposes of the
enactment of Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment was to
remedy problems states had in collecting taxes from the direct
shipment of alcohol.85 The court noted that by "enabling Indiana to
collect its excise tax equally from in-state and out-of-state sellers,"
the Indiana statute fulfilled the purpose of Section 2.86 As a result, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the statute, finding that it comported with the
objectives of the Twenty-first Amendment and did not violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause.
87
B. Bolick v. Roberts
In Bolick v. Roberts, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia considered a challenge by plaintiffs-
consumers and out-of-state wineries-that Virginia's alcohol
regulatory scheme violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
88
Virginia's alcohol regulation law prohibited the out-of-state shipment
of any beer, wine, or distilled spirit directly to a Virginia consumer
without it passing through a licensed Virginia wholesaler or retailer.
89
Producers from within Virginia, however, were allowed to ship beer
and wine directly to consumers within the state.90
82 Id. at 849.
83 Id. at 853.
84 Id. at 854.
85 id.
86 Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 854.
87 id.
88 Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 417, 422.
89 Id. at 417.
90 Id.
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In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's approach in Bridenbaugh,
the Eastern District of Virginia emphasized the Dormant Commerce
Clause in its analysis of the state statute. 91 As noted by the court, the
Dormant Commerce Clause prevents state legislatures from enacting
and implementing isolationist trade policies as they hinder a national
free market.92 In analyzing statutes under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, courts must apply strict scrutiny.93 Further, if the statute in
question is facially discriminatory against interstate commerce, in its
practical effect or in its purpose, a virtual per se rule of invalidity
applies. 94 The court found that part of Virginia's statutory scheme
constituted a per se invalid restriction on commerce, but other parts
of the scheme were neutral.95
Next, the court analyzed whether Virginia's statutory scheme
was exempt from violating the Dormant Commerce Clause under the
Twenty-first Amendment. While the court acknowledged that states
"enjoy constitutional protection for no other article of commerce like
the authority it has under the Twenty-first Amendment," this
protection has limits.97 According to the court, when a state law
"'regulates the sale of alcoholic beverages ... its discriminatory
character eliminates the immunity afforded by the Twenty-first
Amendment. 98
The court then examined the Seventh Circuit's analysis in
Bridenbaugh of the tension between the Twenty-first Amendment
and the Dormant Commerce Clause. 99 According to the Eastern
District of Virginia, the Seventh Circuit departed from existing case
law regarding the Twenty-first Amendment and the Dormant
Commerce Clause.'00 The court further recognized that it was bound
91 Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
92 id.
93 Id. at 424 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624-27
(1918); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984)).
94 Id.
9' Id. at 425.
96 Id. at 428.
97 Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 428.
98 Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 344 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
99 Id. at 429.
1oo Id. at 433.
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by prior Fourth Circuit and United States Supreme Court decisions
that have included the Dormant Commerce Clause in its analysis of
state law restrictions on alcohol shipments.' 0' In addition, the court
had the following to say about the Bridenbaugh decision:
To accept the Bridenbaugh court's decision as dispositive
would require explicit rejection of the applicability of the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause. Such a result would
constitutionally marginalize and dismiss the [D]ormant
Commerce Clause on the basis that because it does not
appear in the Constitution, it is only an inference that must
be discarded. That conclusion is unacceptable in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions resolving the conflict between
the Twenty-first Amendment and the rest of the
Constitution. 102
Given the court's finding that Virginia's statutory scheme was
per se valid, Virginia had the burden of demonstrating that there was
no other means of fulfilling the state's objective of promoting
temperance and protecting minors from alcohol. °3 Virginia's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board argued that out-of-state sources
would not be subject to monitoring by agents. 104 However, the court
found that this was a hollow argument since in-state entities that
directly ship to consumers were subject to significantly less
supervision than the three-tier system that applied to out-of-state
sources. ° 5 Thus, the court found that the state had failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact regarding any justification for the
discriminatory policy.'0 6 Stating that Virginia "cannot claim with a
'straight face' that its ban on direct shipment is for any reason other
than economic protectionism," the court held the statute
unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause.10 7
101 Id.
102 Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 434 (citation omitted).
103 Id. at 446.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. In April 2003, Virginia's legislature enacted several bills, which the
governor signed into law, that alter the statutory regime analyzed in Bolick v.
Roberts. See 2003 Va. Acts. ch. 1029-30. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated and remanded the case to the Eastern District of Virginia in light
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C. Dickerson v. Bailey
In Dickerson v. Bailey, the plaintiffs alleged that Section
107.12 and 107.07(f) of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause.'0 8 Section 107.07(f) prohibited the
direct shipment of alcohol from out-of-state sources to Texas
residents. 109 Section 107.12, on the other hand, expressly permitted
the shipment of wine from Texas wineries to Texas residents.1 0
According to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, there are two basic approaches to addressing the
tension between the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first
Amendment."' The first approach, endorsed by the Seventh Circuit
in Bridenbaugh, interprets Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
as providing nearly absolute plenary power to the states in regulating
alcohol.112 The other approach, demonstrated by the Eastern District
of Virginia in Bolick, attempts to harmonize the relationship between
Section 2 and the Dormant Commerce Clause by recognizing the
state's right to protect the health of its citizens along with the federal
interest in nationwide competition." 3
The Dickerson court found that section 107.07(f) was facially
unconstitutional, as it placed unequal burdens on in-state and out-of
state wine-sellers. '14 The court held that requiring out-of-state wine
sellers to go through Texas wholesalers was impermissible since in-
state wineries were not subject to the same requirements. 115
of these new laws. Bolick v. Danielson, 330 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam), vacating as moot, Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2002).
Because the new enactments modify portions of some statutes that are the subject
of this case, they render portions of this case moot for purposes of appeal. For the
purposes of discussing recent decisions regarding the regulation of online liquor
sales, however, the Eastern District of Virginia's decision in Bolick v. Roberts is
still relevant as one of the first attempts by an appellate court to analyze such state
regulations.
18 Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 676-77 (S.D. Tex. 2002), aff'd,
336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
109 TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 107.07(f) (2002).
''0 Id. § 107.12.
Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 678-79.
12 Id. at 678-79.
t 13 ld. at 679.
114 Id. at 694.
" Id. at 695.
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Furthermore, the language accompanying section 107.12 explicitly
reflected a protective concern for the growing wine industry in Texas
and the legislature's desire to help Texas wineries compete with
established wine growers.'16
D. Other Recent Decisions
Other jurisdictions in the past year have weighed in on the
constitutionality of liquor laws that restrict out-of-state direct
shipment to consumers. In Beskind v. Easley, the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina found that
certain provisions of the North Carolina alcoholic beverage control
laws discriminated against out-of-state wine manufacturers." 7 The
North Carolina statutory scheme prohibited out-of-state wineries to
direct ship to state residents, but North Carolina wineries that were
licensed to do business in the state were exempt from this rule.' 18 The
court held the statute unconstitutional because its preference for in-
state wineries represented economic protectionism and was therefore
barred by the Dormant Commerce Clause. 19 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the in-state
preferences were unconstitutionally discriminatory120 and that it was
not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.' 21 The Fourth Circuit,
however, held that the appropriate remedy was to strike down the
statute creating the preference for local wineries, rather than the
provisions regulating shipments of wine by out-of-state entities.' 22
In Swedenburg v. Kelly, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York invalidated a New York ban on
the direct shipment of out-of-state wine.123 New York's statute was
similar to other state statutes, as it prohibited the direct shipment of
alcoholic beverages to consumers, but had exceptions for in-state
116 Id.
117 Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464, 476 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
"' Id. at 467.
"9 Id. at 473.
120 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2003).
121 Id. at 517.
122 Id. at 519-20.
123 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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wineries.124 The court noted that the exceptions were enacted to
provide an economic benefit for local farmers, and as a result found
the statute discriminatory.1
25
Finally, in Bainbridge v. Turner, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals recently vacated a district court ruling that upheld Florida's
direct shipping ban and remanded the case for determination as to
whether the "regulatory scheme [was] so closely related to the core
concern of raising revenue as to escape Commerce Clause
scrutiny." 126
IV. Conclusion
Representative Cliff Stearns, chairman of the Subcommittee
hearings on state regulation of e-commerce, observed: "[T]here
seems to be a trend where new state laws are enacted and old ones are
reinterpreted with the distinct objective of protecting parochial, local
commercial interests from out of State on-line competitors."'1 27 That
assessment clearly appears to be the case. E-commerce has threatened
a number of entrenched brick-and-mortar industries, and these
industries have responded by lobbying state legislatures to pass new
legislation and by defending statutes favorable to their particular
industry. While advocates supporting current restrictions on e-
commerce purport to be pro-consumer, many of the statutes they
defend, particularly those regulating interstate shipment of alcohol,
have been dismissed as protectionist by many courts.
Historically, as new technologies emerge, those entities
representing the established practice often get displaced. A current
example of this phenomenon is occurring with intermediaries, such as
liquor wholesalers, who find their industries threatened by the growth
of e-commerce. This growth is reflected in the fact that online
commercial transactions are expanding at a rate of double-digit
increases every year. 128 With new people familiarizing themselves
with the Internet every day, it is unlikely that this trend is going to be
reversed.
These attempted barriers to e-commerce have an
anticompetitive effect on the marketplace. Therefore, it is necessary
124 Swedenburg, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
125 Id. at 148.
26 Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (11 th Cir. 2002).
127 Hearing, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Rep. Steams).
128 Id.
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to analyze the purpose and content of existing and proposed state
statutes. The statutes that claim to provide consumer protection
through the restriction of e-commerce need to be reviewed in light of
the potential of the Internet to revolutionize business and provide
consumers with a variety of choices. When the purpose of these
statutes is actually the protection of local interests, at the expense of
out-of-state retailers, the resulting harmful lack of competition clearly
outweighs the perceived benefits of such legislation.

